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Foreign Corioration-Service of Process.
Any service which would be sufficient as against a domestic corpora-
tion may be authorized by the statute of a* state to commence an action
against a foreign or non-resident corporation. It may, arcordingly, be
made upon the president of a foreign corporation during the time he
may be temporarily abiding within the jurisdiction of the court where
the suit is brought..
A judgment to be rendered in an action thus commenced against a
foreign corporation will be valid, and can be enforced against any property
at any time found within the state.-(Syllabus by the court.)
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON A FOREIGN CORPORATION.
It is not surprising that in dealing with "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law," questions and problems more or less troublesome should
arise. It is true ehiough when it is sought to determine the
status of a corporation and its powers within the jurisdiction
which created it, but when territorial lines are passed, and the
rights and liabilities of a corporation in a foreign jurisdiction
become involved, the "invisible, intangible" character of the
"artificial being" becomes more pronounced and the questions
arising become correspondingly more difficult of solution.
And this seems but natural when we are told that a "cor-
poration being the mere creation of local law, can have no
legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where
created" (Paul v. Vz., 8 Wall. 181); but that statement is
subject to qualifications to be noted later on.
'Reported in 47 La. Ann.
68o
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Among the questions which do arise in such cases is that
of the liability of a corporation to suit in a foreign jurisdiction,
and this question involves the primary one: How may pro-
cess be' served upon such' foreign corporation? It was
stated by Judge STORRS, in Mfiddlebrooke v. Springfield Fire
Insurance Co., 14 Conn. 301, that "b,- the common law' there
is no process which can be served either'upon natural persons
not inhabitants of or within the realm, or upon -foreign cor-
porations, by which their appearance, can be compelled in any
court, for the reason that the former are not found within the
realm and the -latter has no corporate existence within it, .nor
'could either be compelled to appear by an attachment of their
property: Con. Dig.'(attachment), I Tidd Pr. 116; '16 Johns.
Rep. 5; 16 Pick. 274. If, therefore, they can be brought
into court, it must be by virtue of some statutory provisions."
(See, also, Barnett v. R. R., 4 Hun, I 14; Newell v. Ry., 19
Mich. 336; Latimer v. Ry., 43 Mo. 109.) .
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, it was held that to entitle
a personal- judgment rendered in a state court against a non-
resident, to be received in evidence in the Federal courts, per-
sonal service of citation on the party or his voluntary appear-
ance is essential to thejurisdiction of the court, except, possibly,
in a proceeding to determine the status of a' citizen towards a
rion-resident, or where a party agrees that service upon another
shall be equivalent to service upon himself. According to
Mr. Justice FIELD, "the doctrine of that case applies in all
its force to personal judgments of state courts against foreign
corporations;" the courts rendering them must have acquired
jurisdiction over the party by personal service or voluntary
appearance, whether the party be a corporation or a natural
person. There is only this difference: a corporafion'being an
artificial being, can act only through agents and only through
them can be reached, and process must therefore be served
upon them. In the state where a corporation is formed it is
not difficult to ascertain who are authorized to represent a.nd
act for it. Its charter or the statutes of the state will indicate
in whose hands the control and management of its affairs
are placed. Directors are readily found, as also the officers
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appoin:ed by them to manage its business. But the moment
the bcundary of the state is passed, difficulties arise; it is not
so easy to determine who represent the corporation there, and
under what circumstances service on them will bind it:" St-
Clair v. Cox, lo6 U. S. 353.
Let us see what some of those difficulties are, and how they
have been met by the courts.
As pointed out by Justice FIELD (supra), the difference
between service of process upon a corporation and upon a
natural person is that the former, "being an artificial being,
can act only through agents and only through them can be
reached ;" but the authority of an agent is not unlimited, and
one who is an agent under certain conditions and for certain
purposes is not necessarily an agent under others; hence,
while a natural person going into a particular place or juris-
diction, cannot deny his own personal existence there (Smith
v. Tuttle, 5 Biss. 159, contra), nevertheless he may, in certain
cases, dispute having brought with him the personalities of
other beings, which he may have represented and been offi-
cially identified with in other localities: See the case of Bushel
v. Ins. Co. (15 S. & R. 173, 1827). In that case, it was said
tl';t the president of a bank of one state upon going into
another state on business unconnected with the corporation
would not represent the corporation there; but the question
was left undetermined, where a corporation locates an officer
within a state for the express purpose of making contracts
there, whether service of process upon him would be suffi-
cient.
This question has, however, arisen and been settled affirm-
atively in a number of cases decided since that time, and is
one which has been the subject of statutory provisions in
nearly every state.
In Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French (I8 Howard, 404), the
Supreme Court of the United States held that a judgment
recovered in Ohio against an Indiana insurance company,
service having been made upon a resident agent of the com-
pany in Ohio, and the laws of that state providing that such
service should be " as effectual as though the same were
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served on the principal," is a judgment entitled to the same
faith and credit in Indiana as in Ohio.
Mr. Justice CURTIS, in delivering the opinion of the court,
said: "This corporation, existing only by virtue of a law of
Indiana, cannot be deemed to pass personally beyond the
limits of that state: Bank of Augusta v. Earle,. 13 Pet. 519.
But it does not necessarily follow that a valid judgment could
be recovered against it only in that state. The inquiry is not
whether the defendant was personally within the state, but
whether he or some one authorized to act for him in reference
to the suit, had notice and appeared; or if he did not appear
whether he was bound to appear or suffer a judgment by
default. A corporation created by Indiana can transact busi-
ness in Ohio only with the consent express or implied of the
latter state: 13 Pet. 519. This consent may be accompanied
by such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose; and
those conditions must be deemed valid, and effectual by other
states and by this court, provided they are not repugnant to
the constitution or laws of the United States, or inconsistent
with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction
and authority of each state from encroachment by all others,
or that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation
without opportunity for defence. In this instance, one of the
conditions imposed by Ohio was in effect that the agent who
should reside in Ohio and enter into contracts of insurance
there in behalf of the foreign corporation, should also be
deemed its agent to receive service of process in suits founded
on such contracts. We find nothing in this provision, either
unreasonable in itself or in conflict with any principle of public
law."
The decision, in this case, however, was expressly limited to
the case of a corporation acting in a state foreign to its crea-
tion, under a law of that state which recognized its existence
for the purpose of making contracts there and being sued on
them through notice to its contracting agents.
In St. Clair v. Cox (io6 U. S. 350), the court in passing
upon a Michigan statute, providing in suits commenced by
attachment against a foreign corporation, that service may be
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made upon "any officer, member, clerk or agent of such cor-
pora:ion within this state," said: we do not, however, under-
stand the laws as authorizing the service of a copy of the writ
as a summons upon the agent of a foreign corporation, unless
the corporation be engaged in business in the state and the
agent be appointed to act there. We so construe the words
agent of such corporation within the 9tate." They do not
sanction service upon the officer or agent of the corporation
who resides in another state, and is only casually in the state,
and not charged with any business of the corporation there."
In concluding the opinion, the court used this language:
Without considering whether authorizing service of a copy
of a writ of attachment as a summons on some of the persons
named in the statute-a member for instance of the foreign
corporation, that is a mere stock stockholder-is not a
departure from the principle of natural justice mentioned in
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, which forbids condemnation with-
out citation, it is sufficient to observe that we are of opinion
that when service is made within the state upon an agent of a
foreign corporation, it is essential in order to support the juris-
diction of the court to render a personal judgment, that it
should appear somewhere in the record either in the applica-
tion for the writ or accompanying its service, or in the plead-
ings or in the findings of the court-that the corporation was
engaged in business in the state. The transaction of business
by the corporation in the state, general or special appearing, a
certificate of service by the proper officer on a person who is
its agent there, would in our opinion be sufficient prima facie
evidence that the agent represented the company in the busi-
ness. It would then be open when the record is offered in
evidence in another state to show that the agent stood in no
representative character to the company, that his duties were
limited to those of a subordinate employee or to a particular
transaction, or that his agency had ceased when the matter in
suit arose."
The doctrine of these cases has been recognized and applied
in later decisions of the same court, the mostrecent of which
is Goldc) v. 2foiziig zc 'Zus (136 U. S. 5 18-1895); in that
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case it was held that in a personal action against a corporation,
neither incorporated nor engaged in business in the state, nor
having an agency or property therein, service upon its presi-
dent temporarily within the jurisdiction is not sufficient service
upon the corporation. In considering the principles under-
lying the question, Mr. Justice GRAY says " It is an elemen-
tar) principle of jurisprudence that a court of justice cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the person of one who has no resi-
denc6 within its territorial jurisdiction, except by actual service
of notice within the jurisdiction, or upon some one authorized
to accept service in his behalf, or by his waiver by general
appearance or otherwise of the want of due service. A judg-
ment rendered in a court of one state against a corporation
neither incorporated nor doing business within the state, must
be regarded as of no validity in the courts of another state or
of the United States, unless service of process was made in the
first state upon an agent appointed to act there for the corpo-
ration; and not merely upon an officer or agent residing in
-another state and only casually within the state and not charged
with any business of the corporation there: " Lafayette Ins.
Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; St. Clair v. Cox, Io6 U.S. 350;
Fitzgerald Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 Id. 98 ; 31Mexican Central Rwy.
v. Pinkney, 149 Id. 94; In re Hohorst, 150 Id. 653. The
doctrine of the Supreme Court therefore seems to be that in
order to sustain service upon an agent of a foreign corporation,
it must appear that at the time and place of service he was an
agent in fact, charged with the business of the corporation
there. In two of the states statutes have been so construed
as to sanction service upon an agent of a foreign corporation,
even though at the time he be merely upon a pleasure trip,
or engaged solely upon his own private business and not
upon any business of the corporation.
In passing upon a Michigan statute, the Supreme Court of
that state said: "We cannot hold under the statute above
referred to that the officer or agent of the corporation within
the state must be here upon official business for his corpora-
tion or specially authorized by it to receive service. To do
.this would be to allow the individual upon whom the service
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is made to determine in most cases for himself without fear of
successful contradiction whether at the particular moment of
such service he was acting as such officer or agent or as a
private person. It would have a tendency to thwart the
special purpose and object of the statute, and such we do not
think was the intent of the legislature. The officer or agent
must be presumed and held as such for the purposes of service
under the statute, and cannot throw off his representative
capacity at will in order to defeat its manifest object :"" (Iron
Co. v. Construction Co., 6 1 M'ich. 226.) It may be noted that
a statute of the same state was before the court in St. Clair v.
Cox, suepra, and see U. S. Graphite Co. v. Pacific Graphte Co.,
68 Fed. 442.
In Pope v. Terre Haute Co. (87 N. Y. 137), it was held that
where service was made upon the president of a foreign cor-
poration while he was temporarily within the state for pur-
poses of his own on his way to a seaside resort, the same was
valid notwithstanding the corporation transacted no business
ror had any place of business or property within the state.
The court justified the decision by holding that " the object of
all service of process for the commencement of a suit or any
other legal proceeding, is to give notice to the party proceeded
against, and any service which reasonably accomplishes that
end answers the requirements of natural justice and funda-
mental law (Gibbs v. Queen Ais. Co., 63 N. Y. 114), and what
service shall be deemed sufficient for that purpose is to be
determined by the legislative power of the country in which
the proceeding is instituted, subject only to the limitation that
the service must be such as may reasonably be expected to
give the notice aimed at." (See, also, Hiler v. R. R., 70
N. Y. 223.)
If this be sound doctrine there would seem to be no reason
why a legislature should not provide that ser%'ice could be
made in such cases by registered letter directed to an officer
either within or without a state; such a mode might " reason-
ably be expected to give the notice aimed at." But, however
much such a law may be recognized and enforced in the state
where it originates, it is unlikely to be approved in other juris-
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dictions and tribunals, for it certainly seems to be "incon-
sistent with those rules of public law which secure the juris-
diction and authority of each state from encroachment by all
others, or that principle of natural law' which forbids condemn-
ation without opportunity for defence."
In Moulin v. Iu. Co., 4 Zab. (N. J.) 222, the court, in
speaking of the law referred to, said: "But I am quite pre-
pared to say that when a corporation confines its business
operations to the state which chartered it, a law of another
state which sanctions the service of process upon one of its
officers or members accidentally within its jurisdiction, is
unreasonable and so contrary to natural justice and to the
principles of international law, that the courts of other states
ought not to sanction it. In such a case a president or other
officer ought not to be considered as carrying his official
character along with him." In that case it was held that a
judgment obtained in New York in such a manner was not
binding in New Jersey.
The attitude of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upon
the question is expressed thus by Chief Justice PAXSON in
.Pihllis v. Lib;'ary Co. (141 Pa. 462): " We do not understand
that the act of 1S4 9 or any of the cases cited countenance the
doctrine that if the president of a New Jersey corporation
which transacted no business in this state, crosses the Dela-
ware river to dine with a friend on this side, he thereby carries
the corporation with him and subjects it to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to contracts made or torts com-
mitted in New Jersey. Under such circumstances he is not
here in his representative capacity. He is not the corporation
nor does he bring it here. If the rule were otherwise he
would carry the corporation with him upon a trip around the
world, and subject it to the jurisdiction of every country he
might visit. We will not designate such a proposition as
absurd, but it certainly has not a shadow of reason to sustain
it."
To these forcible judicial utterances may be added a quota-
tion from the most recent text book authority upon the sub-
ject (Alderson on Judicial Writs and Process), which gives
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special consideration to the subject, and concludes in part as
follows: " It may now be correctly asserted that the presence
of a corportion is in the state where it was created and in any
other state where it transacts business. This proposition
produces the corollary that a corporation cannot be considered
present in a state where it was neither incorporated nor does
business" (p. 2 i9).
That this is well settled law, the following additional cases
may be referred to as authority: Camden Rolling Mill Co. v.
Iron CO., 32 N. J. L. 15; R. R. v. JfcDermid, 91 Ill. 170;
R. R. v. Hook, 40 Ill. App. 547; Silsbee v. Hotel Co., 30 Id.
204; Latimer v. Rwy., 43 Mo. io5 ; Peckham v. Haverhill
Pari/i, 16 Pick. 274; State v. Dist. Ct., 26 Minn. 233; Lath-
rop v. Rwy., I McArthur 234; Dallas v. Rwy., 2 Id. 146;
Sclamidlapp v. La Confiance Ins. Co., 71 Ga. 246; ANeeell v.
]Rwy., 19 Mich. 336; Bushel v. Comth. Ins. CO., 15 S. &. R.
173; Goldey v. 3Morning News, 42 Fed. I 12; Reifsnider v.
Pub. CO., 45 Id. 433; Fideity Vault Co. v. Rwy., 53 Id. 8oo;
American Wooden-ware Co. v. Stem, 63 Id. 676; St. Clair v.
Cox, Io6 U. S. 350 ; Fitzgerald Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 Id. 98 ;
Goldey v. 11orning News, 156 Id. 518 ; see also Mlforawetz on
Private Corporations, Sec. 980, Vol. 25, Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, 132.
It being therefore established that in order to sustain a per-
sonal judgment rendered in the court of a state against a
foreign corporation, it must appear that the corporation was
engaged in business in the state, the next question is to deter-
mine what constitutes being "engaged in business in the
state?" Having an established agency at which the usual
business of the corporation is conducted certainly fulfils the
condition ; but is it necessary that the business be localized,
and more or less permanent and regular in character, or will
a single transaction or acts incidental thereto, answer the re-
quirement of the law ?
This question, though not a new one, is suggested by the
recent decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Louisiana
in the case of Gravely v. Southern Ice M1achine Co., (16 South-
ern Rep. 866), which has been selected as the subject of this
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annotation. The facts of the case as well as the ruling of the
court are contained in the following extract from the able
opinion delivered by Mr. Justice WATKINS: "The defendant,
a foreign corporation, dwelling in the State of Tennessee, sent
its recognized agent into the State of Louisiana, endowed with
special authority to employ the plaintiff to negotiate with
McDonald and Hart, of the city of New Orleans, for sale to
them of an ice manufacturing plant; that the plaintiff was thus
employed and through his agency a sale of a plant was nego-
tiated with said parties at the price of $ I o,ooo, and same was
by the detendant after established in said city. Disagreements
between these contracting parties arose, a suit followed in the
court of this city and state, which is still pending. While
within the state of Louisiana, and in this city superintending
this work, the president of the corporation was personally cited
and served with process in this case, asking enforcement of
plaintiff's demand for compensation for commissions under his
contract with the company. In this situation, we are of
opinion that the District Court thereby acquired full and com-
plete jurisdiction over the defendant corporation pro hac vice.
The principle to be kept in mind, and on which the jurisdiction
of the Federal court is predicated, is the citizenship of the
defending corporation; and, unless the character of the busi-
ness of the corporation conducted in a foreign state be such as
to constitute it a citizen of the latter state pro hcic vice, the
Federal jurisdiction is not complete. But in a state court the
rule is different; the only question there being one of proper
and effective service of process upon an officer legally repre-
senting the corporation, whereby it can be brought into court,
and subjected to judgment, or of proper notice upon an officer
of the corporation to bring the matter in litigation to its atten-
tion, and require its action. The rule in such a case is iden-
tically the same as that in reference to any domestic corpora-
tion; the effect of the judgment to be rendered being confined
to its property within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
state. Our conclusion is that the service of citation on'the
president of the defendant corporation, while temporarily
abiding here, is a good and effective service, on which a valid
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judgment may be founded, which may be enforced against any
property of the defendant company within the state."
In the course of the opinion the court says: "Under our
law a corporation is an intellectual being, who may be sued in
our courts as natural persons are," and it is said that a foreign
corporation is to be treated as a "foreigner " under the Louis-
iana Code of Practice, that is to say, "one who has-no known
place of residence in the state and consequently may be cited
wherever it is found," (citing State v. Fruit Co., 46 La. Ann.
656). The New York case of Pope v. ifanufacturing Co.
.(supra), which decided that a foreign corporation could be
cited by serving its officer, while temporarily within the state,
not in any official capacity or on the business of the corpora-
tion, is cited and quoted with approval; but the court is care-
ful to say, as was said in the latter case, that "a judgment
to be rendered in an action thus commenced against a foreign
corporation, will be valid for every purpose within the state,
and can be enforced against any property at any time .found
-within tltis state. Its effect elsewhere need not now be deter-
mined."
But considering the decision with due regard to the facts
before the court, the case decides that "proper and effective
service of process upon an officer legally representing the
corporation," is all that is necessary in such cases, and that
such was secured when service was duly effected upon the
president of the foreign corporation, temporarily within the
jurisdiction, but, "charged with the business of the corpora-
tion " there, to wit, supervising the erection of the ice plant,
contracted to be established by the defendant, as well as
attending to the corporation's interests, as plaintiff, in the suit
then and there pending, and which related to such contract.-
The decision, therefore, is not open to the criticism that it is
in conflict with the line of cases, to which Goldey v. Morn-
ing News (supra) is the most recent addition, for the facts
clearly show that the officer served was at the time " charged
with the business of the corporation" to a certain extent; but,
as above suggested, the case seems to invite the inquiry
whether the corporation was engeged in business in the state,
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thpe requisite mentioned in some of the decisions already
referred to.
In addition to the Pope case, the court cites Hagerman v.
Empire Slate Co. (97 Pa. 534), in which it was held. that,
though a foreign corporation had failed to establish an'office
and designate its agent as required by statute, service could,
nevertheless, be made upon an agent within the state charged
with the company's business there. The facts of the case
show that while the agent had not been formally appointed by
any regular resolution of the board of directors, lie was, how-
ever, requested by the president to attend to the affairs of the
corporation in Pennsylvania : the defendant was a slate com-
pany owning slate quarries in that state, which were leased
upon a royalty payable in slate; the agent lived in the neigh-
borhood of the quarries, and had charge of the sale and ship-
ment of slate for the company, the rental of certain parts of
the real estate and the payment of taxes ,he gave receipts in
the company's name as agent and accounted to the company
for receipts and disbursements in its behalf. In the language
of the court, "thus it appears, in fact, that lie acted as an
agent of the company. Under ail the facts proved we think
he was shown to be such an agent as to make the service on
him valid." (For a similar ruling, see Foster v. Lumber Co.,
58 N. W. 9.)
It has been held that the Act of 1849 (Pa.) regulating
service in such cases, contemplates only a foreign corporation
doing business within the Commonwealth: PIMllips v. Library
Co. (supra) ; and in 3JcConkey v. Peack Bottom Slate Co. (14
C. C. Rep. 5 I4), it was doubted whether a single transaction
was sufficient; but in lopp v. Mater MJks. Co., 52 N. W.
(Neb.), 819, the court seemed to be free from doubt upon the
question, as appears from the following language of Chief
Justice MAXWELL: "Where a foreign corporation contracts a
debt in this state, as for labor and materials, service in this state
upon the managing agent is sufficient, though he be but tem-
porarily within the state. 'N\ow suppose a foreign corporation
comes into this state and purchases goods to be paid for here,
must the seller go into another state or, perhaps, a foreign
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coun:ry to recover for the same? That is true if service can-
not be had upon the corporation in the state. Then the
selle:- must bring his action where service can be had. But a
person who has authority to contract a debt within this state
for a corporation, is so far the managing agent within the
state that service may be had upon him for that debt that will
bind the corporation. The agent is commissioned .to contract
the debt and the corporation thereby secures the benefit of his
services. It must also take the burden of being liable to an
action therefor." In Galveston Cio , R. R. v. Hook (40 Ills.
App. 547), it was held that where the president of a foreign
corporation is temporarily in the state upon his own business,
there being no agent or place of business within the state, a
merely casual offer by him to receive a proposition relating to
the business of his company, is not the transaction of busi-
ness by an agent, as authorizes the c6nclusion that the com-
pany is transacting its business in the state; the court says
"To be found within the state, a foreign corporation must
have sent its agent on whom service is made, to the state to
conduct its business therein either continuously or for a time,
so as to complete a transaction or an enterprise, or, at least,
charged with the duty of making a particular contract in the
state or negotiating therein for the company."
It may be found of interest to advert at this point to a line
of federal decisions bearing upon this question. It will be
recalled that in the opinion of the court in the principal case, a
distinction was pointed out with regard to the jurisdiction of
the federal and state courts; that the former depended upon
the "citizenship of the defending corporation." This, how-
ever, was not formerly the law, for by the acts of 1789, 1858
and March 3, 1875 (I8 Stat. 470), relating to the jurisdiction
of the circuit courts, it was provided that no civil suit should
be brought "against any person in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at
the time of serving such process or commencing such pro-
ceeding, &c.," the act of August 13, I888 (25 Stat. 433), has
repealed the permission to sue a defendant in a district in
which he isfound, and has peremptorily enacted that ".where
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the jurisdiction is founded only on-the fact that the action is
between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only
in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or de-
fendant:" See .lfcCormick v. Walthers; 134 U. S. 41 ; Shaw
v. Quincy Afining, Co., 145 Id. 444. , In the latter case it was
held that a foreign corporation engaged in business, in one
state, was not a risident thereof; hence could not be sued
there in a federaj court by a citizen of a different state.. But
before the act of i888 it could have been so sued, the
question then being, was it found within the district (?) as
was the question in the principal case. Let us examine a
few of the cases decided under the old law..
In Hume v. R. R., 8 Biss. 31 (1877), -it was held that the
presence of the agent of a foreign corporation engaged in b~usi-
ness in the state, was not the presence of the corporation
itself, within the meaning of the act, "any more than the pres-
ence of the agent of a natural person, a citizen of another
state is the presence of the principal ; " a similar decision had
been made in Pomeroy v. R. R. (4 Blatch. 120), 1857; and in
Maine v. Bank, 6 Biss. 26 (874); but these decisions are
certainly not consonant with later authority. See Wilson
Packing Co. v. -henter, reported in same volume, 8 Biss. 429,
1879.
In Good Hope Co. v. Barb Fencing Co. (22 Fed. 635, 1884),
the question raised was, in the language of the court, "whether
jurisdiction is acquired in an action brought against a foreign
corporation by the service of process on its president while in
this district, although the, corporation has no office or place of
business within this state, and is not engaged in business here,
except that occasionally it has made a purchase of goods by
sending its agent here for that purpose. Its president came
here to adjust a controversy between it and the plaintiff grow-
ing out of such a purchase and was then served with the
summons in this action. Stated in another form the question
is whether a foreign corporation is "found" here within the
meaning of Section 739, Rev. St., for the service of process,
when its president is temporarily here upon the business of
the corporation. After criticising the doctrine of the highest
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court of the same state (Pope v. Afg. Co.), and quoting Justice
FIELD in St. Clair v. Cox, the court concludes as follows:
"A corporation ought not to be deemed ' found' within the
meaning of Section 739, unless it is so far constructively
present at the place where its agent is served with process,
that a judgment against it would be respected everywhere and
be given full force and efficacy in other jurisdictions. Where
a corporation is not engaged .in business inr this state there is
no room for implying its consent to come here to litigate with
a citizen of this state or a foreign state. In this case the
president of the defendant corporation was here in his repre-
sentative character, but the corporation had never been prac-
tically engaged in business here. It had made purchases here
occasionally, but it could have made them by correspondence
as well as by the presence of its agents here. If the purchases
had been made by correspondence it could be as logically urged
that the corporation was engaged in business here as it can be
now. Instead of writing its agent came here in person; as it
has never kept an office here or been engaged in any business
here which required it to invoke the comity of the laws of the
state, it was not ' found' here for the purpose of being sued.
The motion to vacate the service of the process is granted"
(per WALLACE, J.).
Thus a Federal court of New York refused to follow the
ruling of the highest court of the state. In the same court it
was held that in a suit against an Illinois corporation for
infringement of a trade mark, service upon the agent in the
transaction out of which the suit arose, at its place of business
within the district, was sufficient-Estes v. Belford (Id. 275). In
U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co. (29 Fed. I7), it was held:
"When a foreign corporation carries its corporate business, or
some substantial part thereof, in this state by means of an
agent or representative appointed to act here, and having the
charge and management of such business, it impliedly assents
to be found and sued here in the person of such agent;" but
it was there held that the case did not come within the opera-
tion of the rule. In Carpenter v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.
(32 Fed. 434), which was a suit for an infringement of a
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patent, it appeared that the defendant corporation (of Pa.) had
within the state of Iowa a train of cars, to which was attached
the brake which it manufactured and sold, which train of cars
and brake were exhibited and used simply for the purpose of
exhibition; no contracts for the sale of the brake were there
made. The question propounded by the court was : " Does
the fact that the chief officers of the corporation come into the
state with some of its property for advertisement and exhibi-
tion, bring that corporation into the state as an inhabitant or
so that it can be said to be found within the state within the
act of Congress?" The court held that it did not, saying:
"If we say that the mere matter of advertising a business is
the introduction of that business in the state, it would follow
that every corporation located elsewhere, that should send its
circulars into the state, send newspapers with its advertise-
ment, would be engaged in business in that state, and to be
found there for the purposes of suit. The true rule is that
the corporation does not come into the state, is not found in
any state, unless in some way it establishes an office or agency
for the transaction of the business for which it is organized,
and when that is done it has no right to say it is not found
within the state" (per BREWER, J.).
In St. Louis Wire Mill Co. v. Consolidated Barb Wire Co.,
reported in the same volume, page 8o2, it appeared that a
Kansas corporation had made occasional purchases of raw
material in St. Louis by mail and by agents, though it never
had a business office or agent located in Missouri; a contro-
versy arose with reference to one of these purchases made by
one of its officers, and during a visit by him to the city to
attend the St. Louis Fair, he was called upon at his hotel by
a representative of the plaintiff with a view to an adjustment
of the matter ; a discussion of that and other business matters
took place at some length, but nothing was accomplished
thereby; subsequently he was served with process as being
the agent of the defendant. It was held that the service was
not sufficient. After a discussion of the anthorities upon the
question what constitutes being " engaged in business in the
state," Judge THAYER says: " When it is said that a corpora-
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tion is engaged in business in a foreign state, and for that
reason has voluntarily subjected itself to the operation of the
laws of such foreign state regulating the service of processes
on foreign corporations, reference is plainly had to business
operations of the corporation carried on within the state
through the medium of agents appointed for that purpose,
that are continuous, or. at least of some duration, and not to
business transactions that are merely casual, such as an occa-
sional purchase of goods or material within a foreign state."
The doctrine of the Good Hope case has been applied in
later decisions by the same court; in Clews v. Woodstock Iron
Co., 44 Fed. 31 (i89o), it was applied where service had been
made in New York upon the president of an Alabama cor-
poration (Mining Co.), while he was in that city attending to
-the business of various enterprises, including the negotiation of
.a mortgage on defendant's property, and having the bonds
:secured thereby listed on the Stock Exchange; it appeared
that the corporation had done no other business in the state.
The court considered that such business could have been con-
ducted by correspondence as well. "It kept no office here;
it did not continuously or even for a period of some duration,
carry on here the business which it was organized to carry on,
and by the regular transaction of which it gave evidence of
its continued existence. It cannot, therefore, be held under
the authorities that the defendant was at the time when Tyler
was served engaged in business in this state so as to make
service of the summons on him efficient to bind the corpora-
tion:" See, also, Goldey v. forning News, 42 Fed. 112;
Hunter v. Improvement Co., 26 Id. 299: Bentlif v. London &
Colonial Finance Corp., 44 Id. 667; and American Wooden
Ware Co. v. Stem, 63 Id. 676.
In the last mentioned case the officer was present in charge
of one of the company's suits, and it appeared that prior to
the service the defendant had bought in at execution sale a
stock of goods of its judgment debtor, and sold the same in
the regular course of business through a special agent in New
York; also that it had received orders there through a travel-
ling salesman, but that it never had an agency or transacted
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business in the state except as stated. Motion to vacate
service of process was granted.
In the recent case of U. S. Graphite Co. v. Pacific Graphite
Co. (68 Fed. 442, 1895), the Circuit Court of Michigan, in
applying the doctrine of the Goldey Case and the Good Hope
Case to the facts before the court, said : "James 0. Roundtree,
the president of the defendant company in this cause, was not
the resident agent of the corporation, for it had none such in
Michigan; and if it be conceded that, while temporarily here,
at the time of the service made upon him, he was engaged in
negotiations concerning the business of the company, this is
not sufficient to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction
of any court in this state by reason of service made upon
him."
This decision marks a second departure by a federal court
of a state from the ruling of the highest state court upon the
question.
These cases, it is thought, will serve to indicate the extent
to which some of the federal courts have gone, when called
upon to determine what constitutes being "engaged in busi-
ness in a state," and under what circumstances a foreign cor-
poration can be considered "found" within a state for the
purposes of citation.
To return to the decision in the principal case, its soundness
still remains unimpaired, when we consider the facts as they
actually appeared.
The defendant was a Tennessee corporation engaged in the
manufacture and establishment of ice machine plants; that
was its regular business, such a business as would naturally
expand into various states (not necessarily to the extent of
having factories or fixed places of business therein); it accord-
ingly sent its authorized agent into Louisiana for the purpose
of effecting a contract there in the line of its business; the
contract was there entered into, and there to be performed by
it ; it went there by its chief officer to supervise the perform-
ance of said contract (the erection of the plant); and to
enforce its terms by an action at law; while there in such
representative capacity and in that capacity alone, the presi-
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dent was served with process in the suit in question, which
suit related to the contract and business above referred to.
To repeat the language of Justice WATKINS, such would
seem to be "a good and effective service on which a valid
judgment may be founded, which may be enforced against any
property of the defendant company within the state."
It may be added that while the writer concedes the sound-
ness of the decision as limited, considering the facts upon
which it was based, he must, nevertheless, admit that the
doctrine announced in the federal cases above quoted is
equally sound and convincing, and should be followed.
G. H. JENKINS.
Philadelphia, Setermber, 189S.
